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Bartleby’s Consensual Dysphoria
Draft
Robin West
The 2011 Occupy Wall Street protest movement, that for several months five
years ago captured the political imagination and discontents of a healthy slice of the
millennial generation, adopted what on first blush appears to be a peculiar literary
mascot: Bartleby the scrivener, one of the two protagonists of the Story of Wall
Street penned by Herman Melville in the middle of the nineteenth century.1
Melville’s dysfunctional scrivener was prominently displayed on the OWS
protesters’ posters, his story was given several readings during evenings in the
parks, and his very being – meaning both his passive resistance to his employer’s
various requests and his sheer and undeniably animalistic physicality – was widely
hailed by the organizers and occupiers of the 2011 movement as the “original wall
street occupier.”2 Melville’s Bartleby, after all, was an uncooperative employee who
first engaged in a work stoppage and then literally occupied the offices of the Wall
Street lawyer who had hired him, then fired him, and who had then attempted –
unsuccessfully – to evict him. The OWS protesters found common cause.
The appropriation by this twenty first century left-wing protest movement of
a protagonist from a canonical mid-nineteenth century novella didn’t just come out
of the blue. As I will discuss in some detail in the first section below, Melville’s Story
of Wall Street has for several decades now been a staple of analysis by Marxist, neoMarxist, structuralist, post-structuralist, and socio-critical academic literary critics,
all of whom, like the OWS’ers, connect Bartleby’s plight to class-based sympathies,
labor politics, or protest. Nevertheless, and despite both the academic left-wing
interest in Bartleby and the formal convergences of location and status, this
empathic identity of interests between those twenty-first century street protesters
pushing back against the dominance of the .01% – the Wall Street financiers, stocks
and debt speculators, and the money marketers – on the one hand, and a pathetic,
melancholic, cadaverous, anorexic, apparently suicidal, and fictional mid-nineteenth
century legal scrivener on the other, is decidedly odd. Recall, first, Bartleby’s
narrative trajectory, which doesn’t, or shouldn’t, inspire confidence for the OWS’ers:
a few weeks into his employment as a scrivener in the narrator’s Wall Street law
office, Bartleby announces, in a response to his employer’s eminently reasonable
request, that he “would prefer not” to proofread the mortgage documents he had
just copied.3 A few days later he makes clear that he would likewise prefer not to do
any proofreading of any documents,4 and shortly thereafter that he would prefer not
to do any copying either.5 He eventually states that he would prefer not to run
errands,6 and finally that he would unequivocally prefer not to do any work at all.7
Then, for some unspecified period of time – certainly weeks, maybe months –
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following this latest announcement he stands stationary in the office, doing nothing.
His employer – the narrator – implores him to leave the premises, but Bartleby
would prefer not to go, and as the narrator doesn’t have the fortitude to forcibly
evict him, Bartleby remains in the office, sleeping at night and standing stationary
and silent during the day. Thus, his “occupation” of the Wall Street office. Our
narrating lawyer can’t figure out a way to either fire or evict Bartleby that would be
consistent with the demands of conscience, so he eventually leaves the premises
himself, renting an office elsewhere, leaving Bartleby standing alone in the deserted
office space.8 A subsequent tenant with no such moral qualms has Bartleby taken by
the constabulary to the Tombs, where he announces that he would prefer not to
accept food and consequently dies from starvation.9
So, it is true, as his OSW celebrants have all suggested, that Bartleby did
indeed engage in both a work stoppage and an occupation of a “Wall Street office” –
so perhaps it is fair to describe him as the “First Wall Street Occupier.”
Nevertheless, Bartleby’s an odd hero for this left wing populist movement. First,
Bartleby is no Thoreauvian civilly-disobedient protester. He never articulates a
demand of either his employer or the state, he never explains his position, he never
even nods toward a different vision of work, or life, or sustenance, or community, or
humanity. His “occupation” is successful – to the limited degree it succeeds – only
because of the lawyer’s pricks of conscience, and it fails when the lawyer’s
prudential concern for his own law practice supersedes fellow feeling. More
fundamentally, Bartleby does not mount any resistance at all to, or evidence any
dissatisfaction with, his employer’s “snug business dealing with rich men’s bonds
and mortgages and title deeds” – that particular description of the work of the office
Bartleby’s occupying comes from the narrator himself, not Bartleby. Nor does
Bartleby complain of his status or treatment as an employee. He is not striking for
better wages or working conditions. As a number of commentators have observed,
Bartleby doesn’t even refuse to work in any unequivocal sense – he simply states,
repeatedly, that he “would prefer not to” do the various tasks asked of him. And
most notably, and most unlike the protesters who have adopted him as an icon,
Bartleby is utterly, profoundly, will-less, and twice over, in the manner in which he
declares his own recalcitrance: first he states that recalcitrance in terms of his
preferences, rather than with any declarations of will or intention – “I would prefer
not to,” he says, rather than “I won’t,” or “hell no” or “take this job and shove it.”
And second, he uses the conditional, or more precisely the conditional modal case, “I
would prefer not to” rather than the direct case “I prefer not to” even when putting
forward his preferences. He’s stating a descriptive truth about his hypothetical
preferences – a far cry from an unequivocal refusal to do anything. So simply as a
protester, Bartleby’s pretty lame.
Nor does Bartleby make for a particularly compelling proletarian victim of
capitalist excesses. First, he’s an employee in a comfortable office working for a
kind-enough-hearted employer, not a factory worker toiling in inhumane conditions
unto an early death. Melville was by no means blind to the plight of such workers:
simply contrast his horrific depiction of the ashen-faced Maids in a paper factory, in
The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids,10 written just a year after
Bartleby, who do indeed work themselves to an early death manufacturing the
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paper on which the lawyer-bachelors of Fleet Street ply their luxury-drenched trade.
Bartleby’s work conditions don’t compare in the slightest to that of the maids’ – and
his employer’s circumstances likewise don’t come anywhere near the hedonistic
excesses enjoyed by the lawyers in The Paradise of Bachelors. Indeed, Bartleby the
scrivener is closer in economic class and even in the nature of his work to the
lawyer who is his employer – Bartleby is copying those mortgages and bond
documents, rather than writing them, but nevertheless both are putting loan
agreements backed by either real property or business assets onto paper – than he
is to the proletariat working to facilitate those capital processes, and who is so
graphically depicted in Tartarus. But second, and more to the point, it simply isn’t
the case that Bartleby the scrivener’s great burden in life is due to economic want.
Bartleby is not forced to choose dreary or stultifying or inhumane employment over
death; very much to the contrary. At various points in the story Bartleby is given a
menu of pleasant-enough options by his increasingly desperate employer: he is
offered other forms of work both in the office – he might run errands rather than do
any copying at all – as well as outside of it – such as working as a bartender, his
employer suggests, or even working “in the open air” as a traveling companion.11
He is offered the option of living free of charge in his employer’s home, and finally of
simply accepting his charity.12 Once removed to prison, he is offered food, prepared
for him by a prison cook specifically tasked with his oversight, and all to be paid for
by his ex-employer, but Bartleby would prefer not to accept that offer as well.13
Whatever it is, then, Bartleby’s problem is not that he is coerced into accepting
subordinating, humiliating or horrendous work because his only choice is death. He
is not so coerced, for the simple enough reason that he is given plenty of choices and
he seemingly prefers death – even over the choice of not working at all and living
free of charge with his employer. The problem of the novel, though, is that neither
the reader nor narrator has any clue as to why. Maybe he’s doing this as a protest of
the ways in which other workers are forced into employment by the coercive fear of
death, much as a football player might refuse to play a game or a student or a
prisoner might embark on a hunger strike to draw attention to the plight of his
aggrieved fellow students or prisoners, even if the striker feels under no such
coercion himself. But we don’t have any reason to think that social solidarity any
more than necessity is what motivates Bartleby. We don’t have any evidence that he
has any social motivations at all.
But the problem goes deeper. Bartleby is, as several commentators put the
point, really, deeply, truly, inescapably, odd. He seems deranged, both to the reader
and the lawyer-employer-narrator, who does indeed describe his other employees
at various points as useful machines,14 but who describes Bartleby, even from the
beginning, as ghostly, apparitional, pallid, forlorn, corpse-like, cadaverous, or sickly,
on almost every page.15 And, Bartleby is unquestionably sick. His eyesight is failing
him and he eats almost nothing.16 He stares at blank walls all day, day in and day
out. He has biological needs, which he meets only minimally and inadequately, and
needless to say never exercises, although his physical presence looms large in the
story. Bartleby lacks vitality, or animus, as well as will. He has so little interiority
that, as with anorexics, his exterior self is sickly translucent. Perhaps he is a political
dissident of some sort, or an alienated laborer, but what he unquestionably is, is
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mentally ill: a victim of his own inner demons of which both the reader and the
narrator know nothing. It is of course possible to pity him – as the narrator does.17
That pity itself becomes problematic: the narrator has a coldly transactional
understanding of pity’s economic value to the pitier, as well as of the value of the
charity to which it can lead.18 The reader should perhaps look skeptically at the pity
Bartleby sparks, both in the narrator and in himself. But however we come to
assess our own or the narrator’s pity for Bartleby, it is much harder to understand
how we might empathize with such a creature: how, that is, we might recognize
ourselves in Bartleby’s recalcitrance. But this is precisely what the OWSers did – or
claimed to do. Bartleby the story was not just of interest to the OWSers. Rather,
they seemingly recognized themselves in Bartleby the man; they claimed his
aspirations and his humanity as their own, or they claimed their own aspirations
and humanity as his. He was like them. They were like him. Bartleby was their fully
human compatriot. Why? What did the OWSers recognize, like, or empathize with,
in this notably odd character, whose protest, if that is what it was, so spectacularly
failed, and who steadfastly refused to reveal anything about his motivations? Why
did the protesters find Bartleby sympatico, and so sympatico, in fact, as to put his
name on their posters, to claim him as their own, and to read the story Melville
wrote about his fate, in the park?
In the bulk of this paper, I will ask and try to answer this question: what did
the OWS protesters recognize in a non-pathologized Bartleby that sparked their
empathic identification? More broadly, what is it, in Bartleby and in his
recalcitrance that is recognizably and deeply human? Eventually, I will argue –
drawing heavily on and then expanding upon an essay written several decades ago
by Brook Thomas on the jurisprudential background of Melville’s story19 – that
Bartleby the man –not Bartleby the symbol, or Bartleby the distilled essence of
negative potentiality, or Bartleby the vessel – can be understood to suffer from an
extreme case of what I will call “consensual dysphoria,” a phrase I’ve made up, but
by which I mean a disorienting and disabling consciousness of a radical disjuncture
between one’s felt subjective pleasures and pains, and the transactions and states of
the world to which one gives one’s free or voluntary consent. Consensual
dysphoria, as I will describe it, is an affliction felt by individuals – and thus sensibly
subject to narrative treatment – but it is not a psychological malady that afflicts
subjects because of the machinations of intimate, familial, or private life. It is, rather,
a political malady – an affliction – felt by individuals in liberal states, and brought on
by the powers of political rhetoric and influence. My claim will be that consensual
dysphoria has been an acutely felt part of the consciousness of both the classical
legal thought of the mid-nineteenth century and the liberal legalist thought of our
own time period. Melville’s Bartleby had that condition in extremis, and the 21st
century protesters suffer from it as well. They recognized that fact, and identified
with Bartleby because of it. That commonality, I want to suggest, lays the
groundwork for the otherwise pretty inexplicable empathic bond between them.
The first part below discusses in very summary fashion some of the scholarly
literature on Bartleby, with an eye toward elucidating why it is that so few scholars
have felt the need to understand Bartleby’s political malady – or more generally, to
understand his humanity. The second part briefly discusses the jurisprudential
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background and content of the story, expanding where need be on Thomas’s
similarly motivated account from the 1980s. The third and fourth parts introduce
the idea of “consensual dysphoria” as an individualized, psychic manifestation of
some of the discomforts attendant to liberal and neoliberal markets and state
organization, and makes the case that this is the essence of Bartleby’s affliction. I
conclude with some observations about the OWS movement informed by some
aspects of this analysis.

A. Ah, Bartleby! Ah, Humanity?
So, what afflicts Bartleby? What are we to make of Bartleby the man, rather
than Bartleby the Scrivener? Recent scholarship – and particularly Marxist accounts
from the last quarter of the last century, and then neo-marxist and post-structuralist
accounts from the first two decades of this one, all of which I will sometimes call,
collectively, the “protest scholarship” – on Bartleby largely sidesteps the question.
For virtually all of the participants in the protest scholarship, Bartleby the man, or
even just Bartleby the character, is marginalized. There’s just no need to
understand him, apparently, and for some at least, it’s really better that we don’t; it’s
part of the point of the story, in fact, that we not. This alone is striking. The last
utterance of the narrator, and the last sentence of the story, recall, is: “Ah Bartleby!
Ah humanity!”20 Yet his professional readers, and particularly the protest
literature, bleach Bartleby of humanity.
Let me give just a few examples. First, in a seminal piece from 1974, Louise
Barnett read Melville’s Bartleby as an allegory dramatizing either the
commodification of nature into property and then into securities and eventually into
profit – the lawyer’s “snug business,” after all, was managing “rich men’s bonds and
mortgages and title deeds” – or the alienation of labor, either in the office itself, or in
the factories and railroads those offices serviced, or both.21 Barnett’s (and others’)
Marxist interpretation of Bartleby was more than well taken, whatever Melville’s
familiarity with Marx: the novella is unquestionably replete with images
suggestively signifying the deadening effects of both commodification and
alienation, on nature and laborers respectively, from the outside walls that face the
lawyer’s office’s windows on all sides – the literal walls of Wall Street – and that
Bartleby stares at for hours at a time and that encase the office in a coffin, to the arc
of the lawyer’s work: reducing nature, through the processes of law, to “property,”
and then reducing that property to collateral for loans, and then the loans
themselves to profit, all of which is facilitated by, first, the lawyer’s expertise in
recording those agreements on paper, and then the copying and re-copying labor of
scriveners – who are referred to by their employer as machines – and whose jobs of
course are eventually themselves overtaken by machines, although after the time
period of the story itself. All of this is more than ripe for Marxist interpretation.
Nevertheless, it’s fair to say that Bartleby himself, on Barnett’s account, is not so
much a character as he is a symbol: Bartleby is a representative of an alienated and
largely off-stage workforce.22 His malady, his motives, his character, and his
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emotions don’t enter the analysis. They don’t matter. Bartleby himself lacks
humanity. The story, in Barnett’s reading, is a story of and about Wall Street.
Bartleby facilitates the unraveling of an argument. He’s not truly a character, even,
much less a recognizably human one.
The second strand of protest literature is jurisprudential, and plays a larger
role in my own analysis; I will largely endorse and expand on it below. Here, my
point is narrower, and parallels the above: the jurisprudential and Horwitzian
reading that Brook Thomas provided of Melville’s Story of Wall Street in 1987,23 like
Barnett’s Marxist reading from two decades earlier, criticized Marxist readings
along the lines suggested above, but then it similarly sidelined Bartleby himself.
Thomas read Bartleby the Scrivener as dramatizing not simply an alienated,
commodified, or injured workforce (as had Barnett), but more precisely, the
legitimating mid-nineteenth century legal mindset – what is today called (following
Morton Horwitz’s lead) “classical legal thought” – that became dominant during that
time period, and that facilitated all of that commodification and alienation, in part,
by dulling both the class consciousness of the subordinated, and the conscience of
elites, both legal and otherwise.24 Classical legal thought of mid-nineteenth century
America, Thomas argued, following Horwitz, conveyed a rhetoric that instilled,
among much else, a comfort among legal actors with a legal world stripped of
equitable and republican constraints on the rise of the powers of contract, and
hence of any constraints which compassion might have otherwise placed on the
various operations of capital. Again, Thomas’s reading of Bartleby as a critical
commentary on Classical Legal Thought is largely convincing, I think, and I will
endorse it (with substantial expansion and modification) below. The story is
indeed, as Thomas argues, mostly about and told through the eyes of the narrating
lawyer, who in turn experiences – both in the changing nature of his work and in the
changing contours of his conscience – the monumental shift rippling through the
very fields of law in those mid-century decades in which he practiced: a shift away
from equity to legalism, from status-defined and defining relations to contract, and
most broadly, from a republican and paternalistic conception of the community, to a
highly individualistic one, shorn of confining roles but also shorn of obligations of
care of the strong for the weak.25 Here, I just want to note that Bartleby himself, on
Thomas’s reading, is basically an afterthought. The story is just not about him.
Rather, “classical legal thought,” or “formalism,” on this view, is the story’s real
target and, Melville, Thomas argues, whether or not he had a name for it, basically
nailed it. The story is about the ways in which Classical Legal Thought molded,
formed, and deformed a mid-nineteenth century lawyer’s conscience. So, on
Thomas’s view, no less than on Bartlett’s, Bartleby himself hardly enters into the
analysis; the story is not about Bartleby, or even the narrator’s relation to Bartleby,
rather, it is about the lawyer’s relationship to law, or, perhaps, to legal ideology.
Consistent with Thomas’s reading, the narrator’s last utterance – Ah Bartleby! Ah
humanity! – is a cry for the loss of the lawyer’s humanity, effectuated
jurisprudentially. It is not so much about the loss of his scrivener’s.
Third: through the aughts and teens of this century, Melville’s Bartleby has
been taken up in a major way by prominent critical social philosophers as being in
some sense emblematic of the limits, potentialities, and necessity of class-based
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political protest in the context of a totalizing liberal statism. Thus, Bartleby’s
recalcitrance on the job – and particularly the “formulaic” way in which he
expresses his conditional preference not to do it – is treated as a symbol of the
negative potentiality of absolute resistance to an omnipresent sovereignty in
Agamben’s Homo Sacer – Bartleby’s conditional preference not to work, Agamben
argues, “offers the strongest objection to the principle of sovereignty.”26 More
expansively, Agamben treats Bartleby as a symbol of potentiality itself in the
culminating essay in his book Potentialities, which is entirely devoted to a reading of
Melville’s Bartleby.27 Bartleby is similarly invoked as emblematic of an absolute
negative opposition to the state in Hardt and Negri’s The Empire,28 and as a symbol
of the politics of “protestation,” rather than of “resistance,” for Zizek, opening a
“politics which opens up a new space outside the hegemonic position and its
negation.”29 Pushing back against all of these poststructuralist readers, Professor
Jonathan Poore has argued recently that Melville’s Bartleby in no way constitutes
either a Thoreauvian or an Agambenian protest against the state, and that it is a
mistake to read it as such.30 Rather, Poore argues, Bartleby should be read as a
protest against not states at all but markets and the liberal economies that
accommodate them: Bartleby’s refusals are not refusals to participate as a subject in
a sovereign state, but rather, they are refusals to participate in the market-based
machinations of the capitalization of body and soul. Bartleby’s complacent
willingness to be imprisoned, furthermore, far from representing a protest against
the state, for Poore, nods instead in the direction of the need for an activist state
against market-based, private sphere, ideological hegemony, and the private
oppressions to which those markets lead.
But for Poore, no less than for Agamben, Zizek, Hardt, and Negri, and as was
true in different ways for Thomas and Barnett, Bartleby is not a character in any
ordinary sense – meaning one we can make sense of, so to speak, empathically. For
all of the twenty first century protest readers, no less than for Bartlett and Thomas
in the twentieth, Bartleby is a symbol, not a man: he is a symbol, basically, of protest
against oppression, whether the protest be against markets, capitalism,
employment, classical legal thought, liberal individualism, or the state. The protest
readers do embrace – and for radically different and also contradictory reasons, it
should be noted – Bartleby’s conditional preference “not to” – viewing it, alternately,
as the “strongest possible protest against sovereignty,” (Agamben, from Homo
Sacre) or as emblematic of potentiality itself and therefore as an echo of obliterated
pasts (Agamben, Potentialities), as symbolizing a politics of “protestation” rather
than “obstruction,” (Hardt and Negri) or as the embodiment of a negativity so
absolute and so absent of content that its value as protest lies solely in its capacity to
clear the path for humanistic societal reconstruction” (Zizek). But embracing
Bartleby’s near-disembodied conditional preference “not to” – his “formula of
refusal,” as it has come to be called – as a symbol of an idealized even if doomed
form of protest against sovereignty – and whether of potentiality, of protestation, or
of negativity – is a far cry from embracing Bartleby the man, or for that matter, from
reckoning him.
Again note the continuity with earlier readings. For all of the protest readers,
from Bartlett to Poore, the very lack of development of Bartleby’s character – the
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absence of his humanity, in fact – facilitates the reading. There are other similarities
across all of these readings in the protest literature, from the sixties to the present:
they all focus, albeit for different reasons, on Melville’s metaphorical illusions in this
Story of Wall Street to the office as a place that embodies or presages death and
coffins, to the narrator’s multiple illusions to laborers as machines, and of course to
the multiple reminders that the lawyer’s work involves reducing land and labor to
profit.31 And, all of these professional readers have been drawn to Bartleby’s
recalcitrance, and all see in that recalcitrance much that illuminates the
predicament of actors in contemporary liberal and capitalist states. But what the
academic protest readers don’t do is confront or discuss Bartleby as a fully formed,
flesh and blood, sickly man who makes some decisions, acts on them, and dies
because of them, for reasons we might discern. Rather, Bartleby exists for virtually
all of these commentators as an abstraction: Bartleby is a vessel of pure
potentiality,32 or he is a representative of some off-stage oppressed class,33 or he is
simply a plot device who serves to illuminate the evolution of the lawyer’s own
conscience and consciousness.34 This is, itself, peculiar and noteworthy. Again,
remember that this Story of Wall Street closes with the narrating lawyer’s lament:
“Ah Bartleby! Ah humanity!” What Bartleby never is, though, in the eyes of his
scores of politically sympathetic academic readers, is a member of humanity,
sharing much of anything with those who interpret him.
In contrast to the massive protest literature on Bartleby, there is a much
smaller second group of professional readers – call them the psychological readers –
and perhaps many casual readers as well – who do embrace Bartleby’s humanity, or
at least, they embrace, and countenance, his sickness. For these readers, if the story
has any political meaning, it’s a plea for greater funding for services for the
profoundly mentally ill. Bartleby the Scrivener, in their hands, is not a story about
capitalism or employment or commodification of labor or the alienation of the
writing class or for that matter Wall Street, at all. Rather, it’s a story about an
anorexic, melancholic, oppositional and thoroughly unsympathetic employee. The
psychological readers are in the distinct minority, but they do focus directly on
Bartleby the man, and specifically on Bartleby’s oddities, for which they then
provide a range of diagnoses – Bartleby is, depending on the reader, depressive,
melancholic, possibly schizophrenic, borderline or bipolar.35 For the Freudians, he is
a projection of the lawyer’s id,36 while for others, more biographically inclined, he is
(and quite plausibly) a projection of Melville’s own deeply ambivalent relation to his
own career as a writer.37 The psychological readers, unlike the political, do clearly
recognize Bartleby’s humanity, albeit primarily to pathologize and then diagnose
him. The psychological readers, though, also have a problem, at least as acute as the
protest readers: just as the protest readers can’t account for (and don’t try to
account for) Bartleby as a man (and hence, aren’t much interested in the
psychological or psychic dimensions of Bartleby’s malady), so the psychological
readers can’t account for (and don’t much try to account for) the story’s equally
undeniable politics. Bartleby isn’t just any old schizophrenic or melancholic or
manic-depressive who wanders in off the street into just any old office. This story is
after all set on Wall Street, and more particularly in a Law Office on Wall Street;
there are multiple references to the substantive law that constitutes the lawyer’s
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work, just as there is an undeniable focus on the nature of the employment relation
between the lawyer and his scriveners. None of this – the location on Wall Street,
the nature of the lawyer’s work, the focus on the employment relationship itself –
contributes in the slightest to an understanding of bipolarity or depression or
schizophrenia or the lawyer’s or Melville’s id. Most important, though, and as Brook
Thomas argued some time ago, it is the lawyer’s consciousness, and particularly the
lawyer’s ruminations regarding the various relations between work, charity,
contract, and what might be called the ethics of economic life, that dominates the
story. Whatever then may be true of Bartleby the character, and whatever the
nature of his sickness, Bartleby the Scrivener is indeed in some sense a “Story of Wall
Street,” as its title proclaims, and as the political protest readers all in various ways
recognize or assume.
Against this backdrop, the OWS’ers embrace of Bartleby as “the original wall
street occupier” is strikingly distinctive: it stands in some contrast to all of these
professional readers. Unlike the professional psychological readers, the OWSers
seemingly embraced an un-pathologized Bartleby the man: not Bartleby the
psychiatric case or Bartleby the schizophrenic, or Bartleby the projection, or
Bartleby the dream. But, unlike the protest readers, they also embraced a
humanized Bartleby: not Bartleby the political symbol, or Bartleby the class
representative, or Bartleby the proletariat, or Bartleby the enigma, or Bartleby the
ghost, or Bartleby the Christ figure, or Bartleby the messiah, or Bartleby the vessel
of negative potentiality, or Bartleby the plot device. They saw Bartleby, in short,
neither as fundamentally sick, nor as fundamentally symbolic. They saw in Bartleby
a compatriot: a flesh and blood fellow traveler who engaged in a work stoppage,
occupied an office, and ended his life in a hunger strike. The OWSer’s, in other
words, didn’t just reckon Bartleby’s significance. They recognized him. They
empathized with him. In fact, they identified with him. They shared in his humanity,
and he in theirs. So, again, why? Where’s the commonality?
B. Bartleby and Classical Legal Thought
The key, I believe, lies in the jurisprudence. As Brook Thomas rightly noted
in his essay from a couple decades back, Melville’s Story of Wall Street is indeed set –
and was written – at the apex of the jurisprudential era legal historians now refer to
as “Classical Legal Thought.”38 The basic contours of the jurisprudential shift
thereby inaugurated – what Morton Horwitz called “formalism” in his seminal
historical treatment of the era The Transformation of American Law39 – is described,
largely implicitly but also at times explicitly, in Melville’s story, and with almost
eerie pitch perfection, as Thomas’s essay shows. Virtually all of the major legal
developments Horwitz chronicled in his important history of the era are central to
either the law itself, practiced in Bartleby’s employer’s office, to his employer’s
consciousness, which is on constant display throughout the narrative, or to the
background conditions within which the narrator tries to cope with his enigmatic
scrivener: the rise of contract, the demise of both status-based legal relations and
republicanism, the diminution of tort as a regulator of employment relations, the
reduction of any paternalistic role of the state for the wellbeing of the economically
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weak, and the convergence of interest of the entrepreneurial class, capitalists,
industrialists, and the judiciary. All of these were part of the changing contours of
American private law in the middle of the nineteenth century, and Melville’s Story of
Wall Street is set against them. Thomas well captured most of that era’s
transformation’s manifestations in Melville’s account of the life of lawyers and their
scrivening staffs, in his essay. But he missed a few. And, because he missed a few,
he missed one big one: the consensual dysphoria that may be the era’s most
disabling legacy. I’ll take up these points in that order.
So first, the transformation in American law, as described by Horwitz,
dramatized by Melville, and as accurately but only partially summarized by Thomas.
The first such manifestation of that transformation that hits you, although Thomas
doesn’t dwell on it, is the narrator’s self-interested disgust, introduced in the first
pages of the story, with the disappearance of the Equity Courts in New York,
effectuated by the adoption of the Field Code.40 That “merger,” as it came to be
called, of “law” and “equity” eventually caused the narrator to lose his position – and
additional income – that had been accorded him as a “Chancery Judge” – a
distinctive quasi judicial position, which at the time was by custom given to a
member of the Bar and hence a practicing lawyer, and who would hear cases that
arose in “equity” rather than law. As all first year law students are taught, the
“merger of law and equity” which Melville’s lawyer lamented, brought about by that
constitutional change in New York law and eventually in all states’ procedural law,
ushered in the end of equity itself – an alternative system of principles, in some form
available from antiquity, to the sometimes unjustly harsh rigors of rules of the
common law, including the unjustly harsh rigors of contract law.41 A part of that
alternative equity regime included principles that softened the possible harshness
of contract law itself – what later came to be called the “unconscionablility” doctrine,
and which in a tortured history has nearly disappeared – and in part as a
consequence of the merger of law and equity that Bartleby’s employer lamented.42
Second, and as Thomas argues in detail, was the shifting legal doctrine of charity,
brought on in no small part through the opinions of Melville’s father in law, Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw, and which had the effect of privatizing all aid to the poor and
thus underscoring the law’s relative disinterest in providing the same.43 Although
the changing law is nowhere mentioned in Bartleby, nevertheless, the narrator
reflects on his own charitable impulses,44 the existence of private charity as the only
possible source of sustenance for his dysfunctional scrivener, and the tasty “morsel
of conscience” that can be gained by indulging one’s beneficient inclinations,45 both
as a guard against the danger to self and others of indulging one’s own criminal
instincts,46 and as a way to balance the books of civic duty and commercial gain.47
The felt and perpetual conflict between the narrator’s inclination to act charitably
toward Bartleby – to embrace him as a fellow son of Adam, as he puts it at one
pivotal point48 – and his professional inclination to employ him, use his services, fire
him when those services are wanting, and then to evict him when he proves to be an
embarrassment, basically frame the narrative’s arc. All of this Thomas successfully
stands in comparison to the contemporaneous Shavian decisions regarding the
emergence of a near-totalizing privatization of the republican duties of the state to
care for those who can’t do so for themselves, through an expanded role of estate
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law, and more specifically, through not just a greater deference to the will of
testators but also to the demands of family members.49 Family and individual
beneficence, the law declared, not state or community patriarchs, would care for
their own, henceforth. Third, Thomas sets Melville’s story against the radical
diminution of not just the role of status in setting responsibilities in legal relations,
but also the diminishing role of tort law, as the century progressed, as a vehicle for
holding corporate employers responsible for the injuries suffered by their
employees. The latter transformation in particular marked the beginnings of an era
of laissez faire in employment relations, and an end of a more republican as well as
more status-based and communitarian account of the role of the state in structuring
– and protecting – employees.50
Now on the transformation Thomas didn’t note, but which is fully supportive
of his thesis. Of at least equal importance, although Thomas doesn’t mention it, to
both the classical legal thought of the era and to Bartleby, as the diminution of tort
and the rise of private charity, is the expansion, clarification, and crystallization, as
one commentator has put it, of the content of contract law itself – and of contract
theory likewise. Basically, the narrator’s relationship to Bartleby is completely
exhausted by, first, the terms of his contract with him – an employment contract
hastily entered, and then painfully ended – and then, eventually, by Bartleby’s
contractual “tenancy” in his office, also hastily entered and then painfully
terminated. Bartleby’s employment, of course, was “at will” – Bartleby had no right
to his job, and no right to any particular terms, and likewise the employer had no
obligation to employ Bartleby, to keep Bartleby employed, or to oversee his welfare.
Their contractual relationship – both the existence and the continuation of that
contract – depended entirely on their mutual consent. On this point the law was
clear and in the process of becoming all the clearer: the common law of contract law
was in the process, case by case, of shedding the burdens of rules of equity, which
may have conditioned the terms of the contract with concerns of fairness,51 and of
freeing contractors of any equitable obligation to contract with anyone other than
partners who were freely chosen – thus the narrator was no obligation to contract
with Bartleby or to keep Bartleby, or any of his other scriveners, in his employ any
longer than would be useful to him. The narrator could terminate the relationship
with any of his scriveners at any point, a power to which the narrator makes
multiple references in the course of his story.52 The scriveners had no rights –
either to the job, to its continuation, or to terms – that might have followed on the
heels of their tenure in the office, the quality of their performance, or certainly on
the basis of their need. The law that had in earlier times been one of “status” – the
branch of the law determining the relation of master and servant – became
“employment law,” and employment law became “contract law”: thus masters and
servants became employers and employees, who in turn became freely contracting
parties, such that their relations became determined entirely by terms freely chosen
between them, rather than by anything imposed by law. The same could be said of
the law of tenancy: landlord and tenant became freely contracting parties, whose
relationship and the duties it entailed were a function of their contract, not their
status.
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Contract law, in other words, during this time period, became “crystalline” in
its contours: obligations were starkly conditioned on mutual consent, rather than on
consent as modified by, or muddied up by, either law or status. Contract theory was
likewise moving in the same direction: the very basis of contractual obligation,
according to the evolving and somewhat mutating “doctrine of consideration” of the
time, was a promised exchange of values that would prove mutually beneficial, not
any expectation or any reliance created in another by virtue of promises, and not the
prospect of an injury that might be sustained by virtue of a promise broken.53 Thus,
the narrator, according to the theory of contract then emerging, need maintain
Bartleby’s employment – as well as that of his other scriveners – only to the degree
it was and remained profitable to him to do so, a limit on his obligations of which he
was well aware – not any reliance that might have been induced in his scriveners by
virtue of their status. Bartleby’s “tenancy” likewise was subject to the narrator’s
will. The narrator knew that he could charge Bartleby with trespass and have him
physically removed, and in a bout of catastrophic thinking he worries that if he
doesn’t do so – if he impliedly consents to Bartleby’s occupation of his office –
Bartleby may well outlive him and inherit the office through adverse possession –
the scenario that prompted the narrator in a panic to remove himself from the
office, as he can’t bring himself to have Bartleby evicted.54 Both of these contractual
relations – the employment relation and then the relation of tenancy -- dominate the
narrator’s consciousness, and both compete in his ruminations with the dictates of
conscience: the law of contract and property give the employer the right and the
power to rid himself of his noxious scrivener, while the demands of conscience and
fellow feeling – both self interested and not – push the narrator, through the course
of the story, to first maintain Bartleby’s employment in spite of the loss of Bartleby’s
services, and therefore of his value, then allow his tenancy in spite of the absence of
any contribution Bartleby is making that would justify that tenancy, to ultimately
offer him his charity, in spite of the lack of any self interested reason to do so, and
finally, in the story’s last sentence, to despair of the loss of Bartleby’s humanity.
All of the legal transformations that in turn constituted the legal framework
within which the lawyer works and which dictated his relationship with his
scrivener – changes in tort law that limited the responsibility of industrial era
employers for injuries suffered by employees at work, and changes in contract law
that expanded the reach of contract, including contractual powers to limit tort and
status based liability – were ushered in, in part, through the judicial branch,
including through the labors of Judge Lemuel Shaw, Melville’s father-in-law.55 All
are either alluded to or detailed in Bartleby. And, of most important to Thomas, and
I think correctly so, all of these changes in jurisprudence take their legitimating toll
on the lawyer-employer-narrator’s conscience: before the whole structure
crumbles, the legal structures of tort, of contract, of charity, and of status,
collectively, justify, in the lawyer’s mind, his tendency to commodify his own
humanitarian instincts, his contract- rather than tort- or status-based sense of his
duties toward his employees, as well as his attitude toward his own work, managing
rich men’s bonds and titles, and of course managing his own law practice, which is
itself as much a product of contract and property law, as is Bartleby’s work itself.
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C. Preference, Consent, Value, and Classical Legal Thought – in Bartleby
The rise of contract, along with the diminution of tort, the disappearance of
status, and the demise of republicanism, as the basis of social organization, all had
one further implication, however, also vividly reflected in Melville’s story, and which
Thomas, as well as all of the other protest writers, taken collectively, have seemingly
missed. The transformation of the legal system toward contract (and the changes
within contract law as well toward a theory of consent rather than of relationality as
the basis of contractual obligation) partly rested on, and partly generated, a
transformation in the way utilitarian-inclined lawyers and jurists collectively
defined, and regarded, value, or more generally, the good, and hence the common
good, and particularly the value, both as accrued by individuals and as accrued by
communities, which we hope to gain by virtue of law itself. Value might of course be
understood in any number of ways, but two possible ways of doing so had some sort
of contemporary traction or pedigree among lawyers, legal scholars, and judges, by
the middle of the nineteenth century: we might understand value, as did Benthamic
utilitarians, by reference to the quantum of pleasure over pain effectuated by some
change in the world, including by law,56 or we might understand value, as did Millian
utilitarians, roughly, by reference to an ideal of happiness – happiness as
experienced by a well raised and educated hypothetical human subject.57
According to the first understanding, which I’ll call hedonic utilitarianism, a change
in the world, whether effectuated by law or any other act of power, creates value if it
creates more pleasure than pain. According to the second, which we can call ideal
utilitarianism, a change in the world creates value if it creates more happiness,
understood not by reference to felt pleasure and pain, but rather by reference to
some sort of idealized conception of happiness or flourishing experienced by well
educated and mature and moral persons, even if those persons are hypothetical.
Law can be evaluated accordingly: a law, or a contract, or a legal decision, like any
other act of power, is a good decision, or act, if it leads to more pleasure than pain as
felt by all affected parties, under the first hedonic utilitarian theory, and if it leads to
a greater quantum of happiness understood ideally, under the second, ideal or
Millian account.
Both of these early and mid nineteenth century emergent understandings of
utilitarianism, and hence of value, were more or less displaced by the economization
of the concept of value in economic and political theory – a transformation in the
concept of value that came on the heels of, but also somewhat concurrently with, the
rise of contract over tort and status in law, as historicized by Horwitz, as
dramatized, somewhat, by Melville, and as felt and lived by Melville’s lawyer on Wall
Street. Rather than either subjective pleasure and pain, as was true on hedonic or
benthamic conceptions of value, or objective conceptions of happiness, as per Mill,
as the marker of value, according to pivotal economic and political theorists of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, we should look instead to the
fulfillment, or satisfaction, of felt individual preferences – and hence the creation of
wealth – as that satiation is manifested in consensual transactions registered in free
markets. Value, then, on a “wealth maximizing” account, is by definition created by
the satisfaction of felt preferences, as manifested, paradigmatically in acts of
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consent, as registered in free market choices, and not in increases in pleasure or
diminutions of pain, or in idealized incremental improvement in the happiness or
flourishing of hypothetical human actors.58 The reasons for the shift away from
both pleasure or happiness to satiated preference as a means of measuring value
varied, depending on the theorist, but in retrospect two major reasons, or
arguments, for making the shift dominated: First, the satisfaction of preferences as
registered in consensual choices, unlike subjective pleasure or pain, and unlike
happiness or flourishing, can be measured, or tallied, thus lending itself to greater
certainty, and thus providing a more workable metric for decision-makers.59
Second, the use of satisfied preference, rather than subjective pleasure or objective
happiness, avoids supposed epistemic problems with both pleasure and pain and
happiness – the measure of satisfied preferences, manifested in acts of consent, does
not require the actor to compare subjective pleasures and pains across persons, as
is required by hedonistic utilitarianism, or a choice between competing and perhaps
irreconcilable objective conceptions of happiness, as required by ideal
utilitarianism.60 Whatever the reasons for it, though, the transformation within
utilitarianism of these conceptions of the good – away from subjective pleasure or
objective happiness as that which should guide decision-making – to the much more
behavioral conception of a revealed preference between choices, was hugely
consequential. As is widely understood, it gave rise to a normative economic and
quasi-“scientific” account of the goodness of law, largely displacing classical
utilitarian approaches. But second, the entrenchment of that normative economic
account in turn gave rise to what can fairly be called an “ethic of consent.”
According to that ethic of consent, consensual acts and particularly bargains on
open markets without third party affects are paradigmatically good: such bargains
are by definition good, so long as there are no third party effects, because they
definitionally satisfy manifested preferences, and hence create value, and hence
wealth.61
The implications for law, and the way we evaluate and criticize it, of this
transformation in concepts of value – the difference between, on the one hand,
either a tabulation of felt pleasures and pains, or objective measures of happiness,
as the felt measure of value, and on the other, the satisfaction of preferences as the
way we go about doing so – are multiple, but that difference is felt most profoundly,
or at any rate most transparently, in contract law and theory. If value is created
through the satisfaction of preferences which are in turn registered by acts of
consent, then the consensual exchange that is the essence of contract, and of
contract law, becomes paradigmatically good – it creates value by definition.62 By
contrast, this is just not true, if value is understood as tied to either hedonic pleasure
or idealized happiness: a consensual exchange may increase value on either hedonic
or idealized utilitarian accounts of value, if each contractor well understands his
own utility and is motivated to maximize it, but this is by no means necessarily the
case: there may be all sorts of reasons that a satisfied preference may not well track
either felt pleasure or objective happiness. Contract law, over the course of the
century following the setting of both Melville’s story and the transformation
Horwitz described, was dominated by classical legal thought, and during that period,
it basically absorbed this economic understanding of value, and hence this account
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of the goodness of the contracts it governs. One fairly well understood result of this
transformation is an account of the definitional goodness of consensual contracts
that in turn entails a robust – and in fact tautological – argument against
paternalism: consensual contracts create value by definition, no matter how onesided or apparently unwise.63 A second fairly well understood result is that it
prompts a turn toward individualism and against collectivism: individual
consensual acts are the font of value, not anything done or experienced by
collectives. A third is that it created, or prompted, an expansive conception of
contract’s reach: the commodification of everything and anything opens the
possibility of its exchange, and therefore the creation of value.64 Doctrinally, it
prompted an understanding of the meaning of contract that in turn transformed its
legal definition and contours, from a shift in the understanding of both the
consideration doctrine and the rules of offer and acceptance that requisite to a
contract’s enforcement, to an understanding of the rationale and primacy of the
expectation interest, to the rules governing recovery when a contract is breached.
Lastly, and in sum, and as is also fairly well understood, it implied a powerful
argument for the ethical primacy of contract law over both tort and administrative
law as forms of social organization. 65 The latter, in various ways, blunt the force of
contract and therefore frustrate the creation of value – at least to whatever degree
that wealth and preference, rather than pleasure or happiness, are the lodestar of
value.
Now, this transformation in our understanding of value – away from either
subjective pleasure or idealized happiness, to instead the satiation of preference, as
the key to the creation of value, no less than the transformation of American private
law – no less than the transformation of law, is also cleanly reflected, or narrated, in
Bartleby. This is the main point that I think is missing from Thomas’s otherwise
fairly exhaustive account. It’s reflected in three ways, the first two of which I’ll take
up here, and the third, which I think is Melville’s most profound contribution in this
novella, in the next section below. So first, Melville’s story quite neatly presages
nearly a century’s worth of criticism of that transformation – criticisms offered in
various ways from legal realists in the early twentieth century, and by critical legal
scholars, some liberal legalists, some identity scholars, and scores of moral and
Marxist philosophers and neo-marxists from all disciplines in the second half of that
century. One point of commonality across these criticisms is that the consent that
marks value, according to the economic conception, serves to legitimate whatever
structures of power, of politics, or simply of inequality that rendered the transaction
to which consent is ultimately given so attractive in the first place. This
“legitimation critique” of consensual ethics in justifying to the strong and the weak
alike the various inequalities that constitute market economies, has loomed large
over the last century of academic commentary and debate on the economization of
the concept of value, and it also looms large in Bartleby the Scrivener: the narrator’s
understanding of his employees and the nature of the employment contract, his
cavalier dismissal at least in the first two thirds of the book of their economic needs
and the insufficiency of their incomes to meet those needs, his understanding of the
value to him of his own charitable instincts, his regard for the work of equity and
chancery as tied to the income he received from it, rather than the good it does, his
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repeated invocation of the nature of employment-at-will, his understanding of the
meaning and purpose of real property and trespass law, all reflect not only the
machinations and the legitimating consequence of the transformation of contract
law, but also the legitimating effect of the transformation of the concept of value that
underlies it. It’s worth noting that the shift from pleasure or happiness, to satisfied
preference, as constituting the content of the good, is explicitly referenced by the
narrator himself in a pivotal scene, in which he bemoans the oddity of the
expression, both in the mouth of Bartleby, but also as a contagion. All of his
employees, the narrator complains, as well as he himself, have taken to speaking
about their preferences, rather than their intentions or desires. The narrator finds
the shift to the language of preference bizarre, and disorienting.
Second, however, and I think of greater importance, both in the story and in
the world, than the impact the transformation of value makes on the narrator, is the
impact it has on Bartleby – and perhaps on the rest of us likewise. Bartleby, in effect,
is living out the consequence of the economization of value. The most significant
consequence of the transformation in our concept of value toward an economic
measure focused on a behavior – the satiation of preference, as marked by
consensual choices on open markets – may not be its contribution to machinations
of legitimation, but rather, the contribution that transformation has made to the
marginalization of the relevance of both subjective measures – such as pleasure and
pain – or objective measures – such as happiness, or a good life – to our shared or
individual conceptions of the good, and hence of the good life. Again, on this
transformed conception, it is satisfaction of preferences, as reflected in consensual
market choices, that creates value and that therefore defines the good, not
subjective pleasures or pains or objective conceptions of happiness. Subjective
sensations of pleasure or pain, as well as objective understandings of happiness,
either don’t exist, or can’t be measured, or can’t be understood – either way they
just have no use in determining what we should and shouldn’t value, according to
economic and now dominant conceptions of value. Bartleby, as imagined by
Herman Melville, almost perfectly lives out just that economized understanding.
Bartleby is the sum total of his preferences, and his life is the sum total of those
preferences, satisfied. Everything Bartleby would prefer not to do, he doesn’t, in
fact, do. He’s perfectly satiated. And, just as important, is the flip side of this coin:
Bartleby, more than any other character in American canonical literature, has no
discernible hedonic life, and no objective interests, whether captured by a
conception of happiness or not. His pleasures and pains and his happiness,
understood ideally, have been marginalized. And – Bartleby, true to form, has no
discernible pleasures or pains, and, he has no conception of the good life that he
could pursue, even were he to have the access to it. Bartleby is nothing but his
expressed, conditional, negative, and, most important, satisfied preferences: first, his
expressed preference not to copy, not to proof read, not to run errands, not to work,
not to leave his employer’s office, not to take up any other offered employment, not
to leave the banister of his ex-employer’s ex-office, and not to accept either charity
or food, and eventually his implied positive preference to do nothing, to live in the
law office as long as possible, then to live out his life in the tombs, and then to starve
himself to death. None of these preferences, either hypothetical or fulfilled,
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translate into a knowable, communicable subjective hedonic life: his employer
cannot discern Bartleby’s inner life, but particularly cannot discern what pleases or
pains him. Nor does Bartleby have any identifiable, knowable, conception of the
good or of happiness that he is pursuing. He is nothing but his preferences, virtually
all of which are satisfied: he does no copying, no proofreading and eventually no
work, he remains in the office and then in prison as was his preference, without food
as was likewise what he preferred, until he died, again by force of his own
preference. He has plenty of preferences, all of which are satisfied. What Bartleby
utterly lacks is precisely what is rendered marginal or non-existent by our
transformation to an economized conception of value: any interior hedonic life or
objective conception of the good. Bartleby, as a character, is nothing but the very
behavior that has come to constitute our conception of value. And that conception
kills him.
If we centralize this feature of Melville’s story – Bartleby’s character,
decisions, and role in the story, rather than the narrator’s conscience or
consciousness, law itself, or the role of legitimation in the narrator’s mindset – and
we then feature this aspect of Bartleby’s character – his enactment of the then rising
and now dominant economic theory of value in the way we think about the good –
and if we don’t romanticize that enactment (as the protest readers all do, Agamben
almost absurdly so) or pathologize it, then much of the mysteriousness of Bartleby,
as a character, and of his reception, withers away. It is clear, first, why so many
readers can’t empathize with Bartleby – he reveals no hedonistic life with which to
empathize and no conception of the good by which we can understand him. It’s also
clear why he is so existentially disturbing to his employer: in this quite central
respect, the lawyer too much resembles him. Bartleby personifies the way in which
the narrator himself understands the value of his employees, his own value to his
clients, the value of his charitable and humane instincts, and the value of his work to
the world – and it is a profoundly disturbing and, yes, inhumane picture. Likewise,
it’s clear why Bartleby’s repeated use of the phrase “I would prefer” drives his
employer to an irritated distraction: it presents a conception of a human being
whose self understanding and whose value consists of a hypothetical inference that
can be drawn about a superficial aspect of his life from a small slice of behavior,
rather than from any deeper understanding of subjective life or any objective
conception of the good. Bartleby’s idiosyncrasies are also clarified. It’s clear, for
example, why Bartleby eats so little – he doesn’t take anything in, because he has no
interiority, no subjectivity, no mammalism or animalism, and hence no biologic
inner being that consists of soft squishy matter sustained and nurtured by food – he
is, again, the sum of his revealed preferences. He’s behavior, not substance,
particularly soft, squishy, internal substance. And it’s clear why he has no interests,
no family, no ambition, and no human connections – just as he has no interiority, he
has no objectively defined or ascertainable conception of what it might mean to lead
a good life. Thus, as is true of the economized conceptions of value that have now so
dominated contract law, and increasingly law across the board, both subjective
hedonism and objective interest have been displaced, in Bartleby and in how we
understand him, by a tabulation of his satisfied preferences, as measures of what is
good and right.
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Mostly, though, it’s clear why Bartleby’s humanity is in fact so ambiguous:
Bartleby has no hedonic life, and he has no ideal life. Both are essential to our
humanity. Rather, what is of value to him, as well as the value he produces,
according to this conception of value imposed upon him, is not tied to either his
animality, or to his mammalism, or to his own or any other conception of the good –
what is of value is not tied to either his subjective hedonism nor to objective
understandings of happiness. It is tied instead to the satisfaction of his preferences
– both his positive and negative preferences – as they are registered on discernible
markets. It is tied, in other words, to a small piece of behavior – a “revealed
preference” – that is common to humans, corporations and computers all –
common, that is, to any entity that can on the basis of an algorithm register a choice
between proffered alternatives. There’s just nothing distinctively or particularly
human about any of that.
D. Bartleby’s Consensual Dysphoria
Finally, a focus on Bartleby as a man, who enacts – who lives out – the
economization of value, also might clarify the basis on which some might empathize
with him, in spite of all of this: in spite, that is, of his peculiarity, and in spite of the
inhumanity of the conception of value he enacts. Bartleby is not in fact a machine, or
a ghost, or a cadaver, as the narrator is well aware. He does, after all, show flickers
of an inner life at various points in the story: he expresses his exasperation and
dismay – in fact, his pain – with his employer’s obtuseness regarding his own failing
eyesight,66 he expresses contempt for his employer’s presence in the jail,67 and he
expresses a positive desire for stability in his life.68 He shows enough of his hedonic
self, in fact, that his misery – his melancholy – comes through. And, also in common
with the other humans who walk the planet, he does have a past: we know he
worked in a dead letter office. We know also something of his conception of the
good life: we know that he wishes to remain both relatively stationary – still – but
also unconfined.69 We know he experiences pain from his predicament, although we
see little or none of it, and virtually no pleasure. How might this Bartleby – a
Bartleby who experiences pleasure and pain but only fleetingly reveals it, and who
may have a conception of the good although it mostly cannot be known to us,
experience the conception of value he enacts? How does Bartleby experience the
economized theory of value to which he so methodically and repetitively gives
voice? How do any of the rest of us experience that conception of value?
This is not a question that gets much asked, even by critics of economized
value. To review: value, on the economized view, is created paradigmatically
through consensual exchanges, or bargains, that satisfy the preferences of the
parties, including consensual exchanges of labor for pay. This view displaces two
quite different conceptions of value: one, hedonistic, that identifies value with
pleasure and pain, and the second, idealist, which identifies value, roughly, with the
furtherance of objective interests or some objective account of the good. As the
economic conception rises in prestige and then influence, particularly as ways to
evaluate law and politics, both of these alternatives recede: there is, after all, no
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necessary connection between the creation of value, so defined, on the one hand,
and either pleasure and pain, or any conception of the good, on the other.
Now, the split between the economized conception of value that centers
preferences, and the Millian (or Aristotlean, or Nussbaumian) conception of value
mentioned above that center objective interests or accounts of the good (or of
human flourishing), has been much criticized, by critics.70 For any number of
reasons, well catalogued by those critical accounts, individuals may consent to
transactions which don’t further their own interests, on virtually any defensible
conception of the good life, and because of that disjuncture, there is a very real gap
between the value created by economic measures and the furtherance of the good,
as understood by philosophers, both for those who so consent and third parties. An
individual may have internalized, for example, a stunted conception of his own
potential, or a warped understanding of the choices facing him. Because of
background, training, or upbringing, he or she may have a distorted sense of what
will or won’t be “in his interest.” Even more clearly, his revealed preferences as
between proffered choices are a function of the choices he is offered, and those may
be negligible; even Aesop understood that the wolf may come to have a taste for
sour grapes, simply because those are the grapes close to the ground and within
reach.71 Or, the individual may have a false understanding of what leads to a good
life because he has been trained for a life of obedience or submission. A wife may
think that a life ruled solely by the demands of maternity, or the mandates of a
patriarch, is the best to which she can aspire – and so on. There are any number of
reasons our contractually revealed preferences may not further our objective
interests. A contract law, and law generally, that doesn’t incorporate in some
fashion this pretty obvious truth will entrap its subjects in the preferences their
current situation dictates, and will thus legitimate the possibly unjust hierarchical
arrangements that in part generate those thwarted choices. Our choices, in other
words, for any number of well recognized reasons, may not be in our own best
interest, and when they are not, there is at least an argument for paternalistic or
administrative intervention into markets, based on a shared conception of the good
– the value of which must then be weighed against the liberty thereby sacrificed.
What has not been so criticized, though, or studied, are the consequences of
the abandonment of hedonistic – or, loosely, Benthamic – accounts of value, and
their displacement with preference-based conceptions. Presumably, just as we
sometimes prefer that which is not in our objective interest, because of the influence
of pernicious forces, likewise we sometimes prefer that which will not subjectively
please us, or something which may subjectively pain us. Just as we may be mistaken
about our interests so we may be mistaken about what will further minimize our
pain or promote our pleasures. Or, we may harbor masochistic tendencies. Or, we
may be inclined to prioritize the interests of others (such as masters or patriarchs)
over our own pleasure and pain. Or, we may be inclined to react altruistically rather
than selfishly and for that reason sacrifice our subjective hedonistic utility. Our
revealed preferences may not reflect our own inner calculation of pleasure and pain.
Pleasure and pain may not, in fact, be our “masters.” Bentham might have just been
wrong about that.
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Of course, if we simply define pleasure as that which we maximize, and pain
as that which we minimize, when we satisfy our preferences, then the problem
disappears: there simply can be no disjunction, by definitional fiat, of the pleasures
and pains felt by our hedonic self and our satiated preferences acted upon by our
preferring self. But what happens if, in the face of this definitional circularity, we
nevertheless experience our satisfied preferences, on the one hand, and our pleasure
and pain as diverging? What if, contrary to that seductive definitional assumption,
we actually experience ourselves as consenting to transactions in situations where
those transactions do not please us hedonically and rather cause pain? How do we
“process” that disparity, mentally, psychically, emotionally? How do we live with the
fact that some of our choices, unquestionably consensual, unambiguously registered
in our market choices, and that undoubtedly satiate our preferences without even a
hint of false consciousness entering the picture, make us miserable? How do we
process the disconnect between the self presupposed by the economization of value
– one which is made subjectively more pleasant and less pained with every
consensual trade and with every satiated preference – and the self we might
experience, that is made miserable by the choices we make between miserable
options? How do we reconcile our hedonic self, so marginalized, and our preferring
or consensual self, so elevated by the economization of value?
One way, I suggest, that we might react to such a disjuncture may be with a
dysphoric alienation from one’s hedonic self, which brings me round to my title, and
back to Bartleby. The hedonic self – the self that reckons pleasure and pain, that
registers desire, that feels the world as hot or cold or smooth or rough, that is
pained or pleased or soothed or hurt by fire and wind and rain and children and
parents and sex and work and love and fear – that self, simply recedes, in felt
importance, presence, and vitality, even to oneself, as the consensual, choosing, and
preferring self – rather than the experiencing hedonic self – takes center stage.
One’s choices, particularly one’s market choices, reflect our satiated preferences,
and because they do so, they definitionally create value. Presumably, they should
track as well our conception of the good – they should further the interests of our
ideal self – and presumably, they should also maximize our felt pleasures and
minimize our pain – they should further the interests of our hedonic self. But what
if they don’t? If they don’t further our interests, then we squelch the ideal self, and
all our awareness of it, as critics of the economized conception of the self have long
maintained: we quiet our ambitions, we settle for sour grapes, we limit our reach,
we dull our own consciousness. What has not been so noticed, though, is what
happens when they don’t track our hedonic selves. Might we likely just squelch that
one as well? And if so, what does that mean? It might mean at least this much: it
might mean that we dull our capacity for intense pleasure, because we have
minimized its relevance to our own wellbeing. It might mean that we marginalize
the importance of our own desires, because we no longer heed their guidance. It
might mean that we minimize the significance and meaning of our own pain,
because we don’t avoid its cause. Basically, it might mean that we might turn away
from those lessons of the two hedonic masters Bentham thought we invariably,
always, respect – pain and pleasure – in order to accommodate the world that
displeases us, by casting the self so pained or displeased aside.
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If we do that over a long enough period of time – maybe an entire adulthood
– if we consistently consent to that which displeases or pains us – then I think it’s
fair to say that the result might be “consensual dysphoria”: dysphoria, because like
all forms of dysphoria, it is an intense unease in one’s own body, and “consensual,”
because the root of the experience is the disconnect between the act of consent and
the presumed increase in wellbeing it brings, according to the economized theory of
value, and the displeasure or pain felt by one’s hedonic self by virtue of what that
consenting self is up to. The economic self consents to transactions, trades, and
bargains, satiating preferences along the way. The hedonic self feels no increase in
wellbeing when the economic self does so. Yet the former is supposed to bring
about the latter. But it doesn’t. So, the hedonic self is minimized, or cabined, or
numbed, or erased. The point I want to insist on is that this phenomenon, if it exists,
is not false consciousness, sour grapes, or “exogenous preferences.” Those too are
real phenomena, found in the gap between the economic self and the ideal self, the
gap between our choices, and what does or doesn’t further one’s own interests. It is
the gap, in other words, between the satiation of preference, which creates
economic value by definition, and the furtherance of interest, which might or might
not be occasioned by preference-based decisions. By “consensual dysphoria”, I
mean to refer to the subjective experience of a different gap – not between
preference and objective interest, however defined, but rather, between preference
and pleasure, between the economic and the hedonic self. Where there is a gap, if it
is experienced as such, the result might be dysphoria. If it is experienced routinely,
across the course of a lifetime, the hedonic self might just die.
Perhaps Bartleby, as depicted by Melville, suffers from consensual dysphoria,
and perhaps that accounts for the ability of some of us, including a number of OWS
protestors, to empathize with him. We can all recognize, readily, the gap between
Bartleby’s preferring self and his ideal self. Bartleby prefers not to work, find his
own home, avoid jail, have intimacy in his life, or eventually, to eat. Yet, his ideal self
– his real interests, the good he ought to be pursuing – we all – narrator, reader,
passersby – know – would be furthered with work, with pay, with a home of his
own, and with nutrition: all of which he is offered, and all of which he prefers not to
accept. His revealed preferences then are not tracking his actual interests. But
there is another gap the reader and the narrator might see in Bartleby, that is more
disturbing. Bartleby’s preferences are at a radical disjuncture with his hedonic
pleasures and pains, with his felt, sensate experiences of those choices, and with his
biologic being in the world. His translucence, his pallid appearance, his cadaverous
utterances, his forlornness, and his behavior – the staring out the window at a blank
wall, standing motionless, his refusal of money and food, his refusal to move – all
point us to a person who has numbed himself to animalistic and mammalistic
experiences of pleasure and pain. He doesn’t seem to be registering either, and the
more his preferences are satiated, the worse the numbness becomes. His biologic
being, of course, eventually is killed by this – by his own lethal preferences. His
hedonic being dies alongside.
Conclusion
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By 2011, there was no shortage of anti-Wall Street fiction, from which the
OWSers could have drawn moral support, and from which they could have picked a
mascot. Just from the prior thirty years, they could have embraced, as a guiding or
informative text, Tom Wolfe’s Bonfire of the Vanities, a near-canonical modernist
depiction of a morally compromised Wall Street bond salesman, American Psycho,
the graphic account of a psychopathic and misogynistic Wall Street stockbroker who
merges making a killing on Wall Street with making killings, period, Wall Street, the
near-classic film depiction of capitalist greed and crime that came to define the gogo eighties, or Boiler Room from the 1990s and The Wolf of Wall Street from the
2000 teens, both of which depicted the criminal activities of the same penny stock
scammer. Yet it was Melville’s mid-19th century novella, depicting an enigmatic,
profoundly opaque and sickly scrivener, as told by his by-no-means-criminal and
by-no-means particularly selfish or greedy wall street lawyer-employer – a man
who by the end of the story has offered his scrivener his own charity, money and
home in his attempt to save his life – that grabbed their attention. It’s worth
wondering why. One possibility is that the OWSers themselves, by this choice,
seemed to be suggesting that it’s not greedy or criminal or psychotic or even cynical
or morally compromised Wall Street brokers or lawyers that we need to watch out
for. It is, rather, what we value and how. And, one of the costs – not the only cost,
but one of the costs – of what we value, and how, may be our own alienation from
our hedonic selves: the selves that experience the world not as one which we make
and remake through our autonomous choices, but rather, as pleasing or painful, as
soothing or cutting, as nurturing and comforting or threatening and hurtful, as
sustaining or draining. As we discredit our hedonic selves as a measure of what we
value and why, in preference for our choosing selves, we may be honoring our
autonomy while killing the animal within. The result may be a freer self who, like
Bartleby, is cadaverous, melancholic, pallid and forlorn. And dead.
Why did we miss this, if this is, at least in part, the lesson we might learn
from Melville’s Story of Wall Street? I think there are two – fully sufficient – reasons,
although I’m sure there are others as well. First, sustained critique of the
disjuncture between economic and hedonic conceptions of value that the story
plausibly depicts is missing in the academic literature, including the literature most
pointedly critical of that economic conception itself. In law, the focus of the critics of
the economic conception of value has been, instead, on the transformation of
American law reflected and in part fueled by that conception – the critique of
formalism, classical legal thought, and liberal legalism. In moral and political
philosophy, and some legal philosophy as well, particularly from the critical legal
studies movement of the 1980s, critics of the economic conception of value have
focused on the disjuncture between that conception and various objective accounts
of the good, whether those accounts be Millian or Aristotlean or Marxian, and
whether “interest” based, capabilities based, or something more naturalistic. Both
strands of critique are well reflected in the critical responses to Bartleby: thus,
legally sophisticated critics such as Thomas have noted, and commented upon, the
legitimating effect of legal formalism on the diminution of conscience of powerful
elites, and the diminution of the public sphere, and its subordination to markets, and
seen all of that well-recorded in Melville’s story, while moral and political
22

philosophers, including, in different ways, Bartlett, Agamben, Poore and Zizek all,
have seen in Bartleby echoes of the radical disjunction between economics
conceptions of value and some objective ideal account of the good. The
abandonment of hedonic rather than ideal accounts of the good for consent and
preference based accounts – the gap, in other words, between economic accounts of
value and Benthamic accounts, rather than, between economic accounts of value
and Millian accounts – has not generated nearly as great a critical literature, and it is
just that absence that is in turn reflected in the gaps in the critical reception of
Bartleby.
Second, the contours, the profundity and even the logic of that displacement
– much less the dysphoria it might occasion – didn’t set in in any sort of clear way
until several decades into the twentieth century, or three quarters of a century after
Melville’s story. Melville’s story, in other words, was not just a narrative and fictive
accounting of the transformation of American law and value, then under way. It was
also prescient. More specifically, it was a prescient narrative indictment of the
economization of conceptions of value that underlaid that transformation, the
contours of which, however, would only become clear well after the time of the
story, and of Melville’s writing of it. More specifically still, it was a prescient
depiction of the political-psychological maladies that would eventually accompany
it. Melville nailed that in his story, in addition to much else. He depicted – but also
predicted – the maladies such a transformation in value would bring on, as
manifested in the pathos of his famous scrivener. Melville’s prescient account of
consensual dysphoria, in short, is what is missing in the voluminous protest
literature that this story of Wall Street has inspired. It may also be what the Wall
Street protestors found so compelling – and so sadly familiar – in Melville’s most
forlorn character.
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